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This paper examines the effects of Individual Retírement Accounts (IRAs)
on household saving using data from the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances.
We construct a formal model of dynamic utility maximizatíon that incorporates
several important institutional features of IRAs and leads to closed-form
equations for IRA and other saving. After presenting and estimating an
empirícal version of this model, we simulate the effect of increasing the
contribution limit on the level of national saving. Our estimates suggest
that líttle, if any, of the increased IRA contrlbutions would represent net
additions to national saving. We also perform extensive sensitivity analysis;
these estimates imply substantially smaller effects on national saving than
most previous researchers have estimated. Our results are consistent with new
evídence we present showing that households with non-IRA financial assets
exceeding 520,000 provided mare than 60i of all IRA contributions from 1983-
1985, indicating considerable potantíal among IRA holders to shift taxable
forms of saving into IRAs.1
IRAs and Household Saving
I. Introduction
In recent years, chronically low levels of U.S. private and public saving
have generated considerable concern among academica and policy makers. One
frequently suggested method for raising national (public plus private) saving
is to expand Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). First established in 1974
to help workera without pension plans save for retirement, IRAs featured tax-
deductible contributions up to an annual limít, tax-free accrual of interest
and substantial penalties for withdrawal before the account-holder reached the
age of 59-1~2. In 1981 eligibílity was axtended to all taxpayers and the
contribution limits were raised. In 1986, the tax-deductibility of
contributions was curtailed. Congress and the Administration are currently
considering several new proposals to expand IRAs and to create similar
programs aimed at savíng for educational, health, and housing expenses.l
Although IRAs have been very popular, the important economic íssue is not
their use per sg, but whether IRAs raíse national saving.Z Because some
contributions are tax-deductible, IRAs will typically reduce public saving.
Their effect on private saving is less certain. IRA contríbutions funded by
1Currently, the annual contribution limit is the smaller of ( í) earned
income or (i i) 54,000 for a married couple with two workers, 52,250 for a
marríed couple with one worker, and 52,000 for a single person. The early
withdrawal penalty is 108. If either the account holder or spouse is already
covered by a private pension plan, deductibility of contributions is phased
out for couples wíth income in the range of 540,000-550,000 and for singles
with income in the range of 525,000-535,000. Otherwise the contribution is
fully deductíble.
ZFrom 1982-86, IRAs accounted for approximately 188 of all personal
savíng. After the 1986 changes, tax-deductíble contributions fell to 108 of
personal saving in 1987. See Statistícs of Income, Table 1, recent years, and
the Economic Report of the Presídent, 1992, Table B-24.2
borrowing or by transferring already existing taxable assets into IRAs will
not íncrease private saving. Similarly, IRA contributions will not raise
private saving if they are funded by current-period saving that would have
been undertaken even in the absence of IRAs. Conventíonal economic theory
suggests that asset transfers or shifts in the composition of savíng that
wuuld have been dune anyw;~y may occur lor housol~olds wlw vli~w 1kAr: ;~nd ulhor
saving as good substítutes. For these households IRAS may actually reduce
private saving because they províde a higher rate of return on a límited
amount of saving. If the household is already saving large amounts, the IRA
will províde no marginal incentive to save; instead, the prívate wealth
effects induced by the higher return on IRAs relative to other saving will
reduce private saving as long as current consumption is a normal good.3
In contrast, contributions funded from resources that would otherwíse
have been consumed will increase private saving. This will occur for
households who view IRAs as poor substitutes for other assets. Thus, whether
IRAs raise private saving hinges on the source of IRA contríbutions, which in
turn depends on the substitutability of IRAs and other forms of saving. The
effect on national saving is the sum of the effects on public and private
saving.
Previous research usíng aggregate data has generated mixed results.
Carroll and Summers (1987) poínt out that the Canadian personal saving rate
rose relative to the Amerícan rate in the 1970's when Canada liberalized its
tax-deferred retirement saving plan. Skinner and Feenberg (1990) show that in
3Kotlikoff (1990, pp. 237-241) emphasizes these points. Venti and Wíse
(1992, pp. 28-36) provide an alternative, more critical discussion of usíng
conventional economic theory to think about the effects of IRAs on household
saving.3
the U.S., the relation between aggregate IRA contributions and other saving
depends critically on the definition of saving.
Prevíous research using microeconomic data, including Hubbard (1984),
Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992), and Feenberg and Skinner
(1989) has established an important empirical regularity: households that
contribute to IRAs also tend to save more overall, holding observable factors
constant. One ínterpretation of this result is that IRAs raíae the overall
level of saving.
However, an alternatíve interpretation is that there are groups in the
populatíon with different preferences for saving, again holding observable
factors constant. Diamond and Hausman (1984), for example, find large
variations in saving propensities across households. These dífferences
complícate the task of ineasuring the effect of IRAs on saving. To see this,
suppose there exist two groups, "large savers" and "small savers," due, say,
to differences in subjective díscount rates. Holding observable factors
constant, we would expect to see that IRA holders (where "large savers" were
over-represented) would save more than households without IRAs (whare "small
savers" were over-represented). That is, we would observe the empirical
regularity documented in the literature. However, IRAs could still be very
good substitutes for other assets for those households who hold IRAs. In this
case IRAs would not raíse national saving.
This paper examines interactions between IRAs and other saving using a
new micro data set and employing a different theoretical and empirical
approach than previous studies. Section II presents new evidence on IRA
contributíons and contributors. We show that most contributors are either 59
or older or have large amounts of non-IRA financial assets. These households4
may well find IRAs and o[her saving to be good substitutes. We also show that
there are sízable differences in the asset holdings of IRA holders and
households without IRAs. These results indicate that portfolio reshuffling or
shifts in the composition of savíng that would have been done anyway could be
important phenomena. We also review the previous literature on IRAs and raise
issues concerning model formulation and interpretation of results.
In Section III, we develop a dynamic model of utility maximizatíon that
íncorporates several important institutional features of IRAs and leads to
closed form equations for IRA and other saving. The model is used to
formalize several insights concerning the effects of IRAs on other saving and
to provide a framework for the empirical analysis.
In sectíon IV, we present and estimate an empirical version of the model.
We follow the previous formal econometríc literature, Venti and Wise (1986,
1987, 1990, 1991), by estimating and simulating the effects of increasing the
annual contributíon limits from their levels in 1983-5. The effect of raising
limíts is a somewhat different question than "the effect of IRAs on savíng,"
whích is the effect of raising the limit from zero to a given level.`
Our basic findings indicate that of the increased IRA contríbutions that
would have resulted from increases in contribution limits, roughly 2~ would
represent net addítíons to national saving, if the accompanying tax cut were
entirely saved. If one half of the tax cut were consumed in the first year,
this estímate falls to -148. Extensive sensitivity analysis shows some
variation, but, after controlling for how the tax cut would be allocated, our
"Nowever, Engen and Gale (1991) use a simulation model and find the
proportion of IRA contributions representing increases in natíonal saving is
similar for increases in limits from existing levels and for increases in
limits from zero.5
reaults suggest a significantly smaller effect of IRA limit changes on saving




This study employs data from the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board in conjunction with several
other agencies. The survey contains interviews from a random sample of 3824
U.S. households in 1983, along with a supplemental survey of 438 high-income
households. In 1986, 2822 of these households were reinterviewed. The SCF
was desígned specifically to collect data on household balance sheets. It
also contains detailed information on demographic characteristics, income, and
other variables.s
The SCF provides data on IRA and Keogh balances aeparately in 1983 and
together in 1986. We describe the calculation of IRA saving and other savíng
in detail ín appendix C. Briefly, after determiníng IRA balances in 1983 and
1966, we calculate IRA contributions assuming that annual contributions are
constant over 1983-85 and that IRA accounts earn an interest rate of 148.6
If the calculated IRA annual contribution is greater than the IRA contribution
limit (L), we set the contribution equal to L. This can occur because
individuals are allowed to roll over pension funda into IRAs under certain
circumstances, or because oux assumed interest rate is too low.
SThe SCF is described in Avery and Elliehausen ( 1988), Avery et al
(1984a, 1984b), Avery and Kennickell ( 1988a), and Avery, Elliehausen, and
Kennickell (1988).
gThe rate is based on stock and bond yields, reported in Economíc Revort
f the President, 1990, Tables C-71 and C-93.6
Due to the importance of the IRA variable to our empírícal analysis, we
have compared IRA contributions constructed from the SCF with data taken from
a 3-year panel of tax returns covezing 1983-85.~ Summary comparisons are
shown in Table 1.8 Average IRA contributions over the 3-year period for IRA
contributors are ~4,814 in the SCF, while the average in the IRS microdata is
,~5,161. In addition we match the percentage of households with IRAs very
accurately and the percentage of IRA contributors that are constrained by the
limít in all three years fairly closely.9 On the basis of these results, we
believe the SCF provídes accurate data on IRAs and that our assumptions used
to construct IRA saving are reasonable.
(B) Asset Substitutability. Characteristics of IRA Holders and the
Reshuffling Hypothesis
An important factor that distinguishes IRAs from other forms of savíng is
the penalty for early withdrawal.lo In the absence of transactions costs,
any household with a positive marginal tax rate who believed with certainty
~For a more complete description of the University of Michigan--Ernst and
Young Tax Research DataBase, see Slemrod (1988), Christian and Fríschmann
(1989), Feenberg and Skinner (1989), or Joines and Manegold (1991).
BThe SCF data in Tables 1-3 exclude households if (i) the head ís younger
than 25 in 1986, because the data are suspected not to be representative of
the national sample of such households, (Avery and Kennickell, 1988b), (ii)
the household changed marital status in 1983-1986, because we cannot calculate
their IRA contributíon límít, or (iii) either the head or spouse is self-
employed, because there is ínsufficient information to accurately disentangle
Keogh and IRA contributions (see Appendix C).
eAbout 68.58 of limít contributíons were made by 3-year limit
contributors. Limit changes could also affect households constrained by the
limit in only one or two years, that is, households may move into or out of a
constrained state. A limitation of our data is that we must treat households
that might have been constrained by the contribution limit for a one- or two-
year period as unconstrained households.
loTransactions costs, such as the costs of opening and keeping separate
accounts, closing accounts, and understanding IRA rules also dístinguish IRAs
from other forms of saving.6a
Tabla 1
Comparison of IRS and SCF data on IRA Contributors
1983-1985
IRS data SCF data
Percentage of population 24.0 23.2
contríbuting to an IRA at
least once
Percentage of IRA contributors 30.8 26.8
that contribute to the
limít in all three years
Three-year average contribution ~5,161 54,814
(for contrlbutors)
Source: Authors' calculations using 1983-85 data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances and the University of Michigan--Ernst and Young Tax Research
Database.7
that it would not have to cash in its saving until the age of 59-1~2 would
fínd IRAs to be a perfect substitute for other saving.il Each period, the
household would first place all saving into an IRA until the limit was
reached; only then would it save in other forms. If the household's saving
exceeded the IRA limit, IRAs would not provide any marginal incentive to save.
Thus, one prelimínary step toward determining the effects of IRAs is to
focus on the characteristics of IRA contributors. If contributors are mainly
those for whom IRAs and other saving appear to ba very good substitutes, the
effects on savíng of raising the annual contributlon limlt will be small or
negative. We identify two such groups: thoae who are already older than 59-
1~2 (and therefore face no early withdrawal penalty) and those with large
amounts of non-IRA financial assets (who therefore may have a reduced need to
use all of these assets as a cushion agaínst adverae events). We define non-
IRA financial assets (NIFA) to include checking, saving and money market
accounts, certifícates of deposit, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, the cash value
of life insurance, and other financial assets. These assets represent
relatively liquid funds available for transfer ínto IRAs.l2
Table 2 presents data on IRA contributions by varíous groups in 1983-
11Even if the household faced a higher tax rate upon retirement, there
will be some threshold holding period, beyond which IRAs will be perfect
substítutes for other assets due to the tax-free accumulation that IRAs offer.
1ZAssets do not need to be "cashed in" to be placed into IRAs, so
investors need not íncur capital gains taxes to move stocks to IRAs. In
addition, assets already in an IRA can be sold, as long as the proceeds stay
ín the account. Some limited short-term borrowing from IRAs is also allowed
without penalty. These considerations enhance the substitutabílity of IRAs
and other assets for tiouseholds with large amounts of non-IRA assets.ia
Table 2
IRA Contributions by Selected Groups, 1983-85
Grouo
(a) Household Head
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Source: Authors' calculations using the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances
Data are weighted to represent a cross section of the 1986
population.
Notes:
1Calculated as an average of the statistics for those who were 59 or
older in 1982 and those who were 59 or older in 1985.
ZNon-IRA financíal assets are defined as checkíng, saving, and money
market accounts, certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, cash
value of life insurance, and other financial assets. Thís is a slightly
broader definition of non-IRA financial assets than found in earlier drafts of
this paper.8
85.1J Over 608 of all positive contributions were made by households wlth
NIFA in excess of 520,000. Almost 508 were made by households where either
the head was 59 or older or the houaehold held more than 540,000 in NIFA.
These households accounted for 578 of all accounts that contributed the
maximum amount allowed. Almost 808 of the limit contributors were either 59
or older or held more than ,520,000 in NIFA.
These facts have important ímplications. A commonly-made argument is
that most households cannot easily "reshuffle" other saving into IRAs because
the financial assets held by a typical household are very small. For example,
Feldstein and Feenberg (1983) show that a majority of the population held less
than the annual IRA contribution limit in non-IRA financial assets in their
sample. Venti and Wise (1991, p. 124) report that
...financial asset saving of a very large proportion of families is
close to zero...The model prediction of little aubstitution ~between
IRAs and other saving] is consistent with the descriptíve data that show
very líttle non-IRA financial asset saving; there is little to
substitute away from.
However, the relavant concern is not with the asset holdings of the
average household, but wíth the asset holdings of IRA holders. Moreover, when
the focus of the research is on the effects of IRA limit changes, as in the
work of Venti and Wise and this paper, the asset holdings of IRA limit
contríbutors are particularly relevant.
Table 3 presents data on demographic and fínancial characteristics for
various groups in 1986. The data ahow there are large differences in incomes,
assets, and net worth betwaen households with and without IRAs. Over the 3-
year period the median IRA holder received over twice as much income and had
13Data on other characteristics of IRA holders are presented in Venti and
Wise (1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992), Feenberg and Skinner (1989) and in
the studies cited in footnote 21.8a
Table 3
Characterístics of Households With and Without IRAs, 1986
Households
That
All Households Households Contributed
Characteristic Households withcut ïRks wi:h IRAs to the Límit
Median Age 49 49 50 51
Percent Married 63.9 58.3 77.9 74.5
Percent w~ Pension 44.0 39.9 54.4 58.8
Avg. Education 12.2 11.6 13.8 14.3
Avg. Famíly Size 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7
Median 3-year Inc. 63,962 47,000 105,000 133,500
Median NIFA1 6,000 3,000 21,695 41,269
Median Net Worthz 42,710 25,470 107,946 188,943
Median Change in 6,129 2,884 23,500 60,691
Net Worth (83-86)
Number of 62,824,167 45,099,288 17,724,879 3,871,887
Households
Source: Authors' calculations using the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Data are weighted to represent a cross section of the 1986
population.
Notes:
1Non-IRA financisl assets are defined as checking, saving, and money
market accounts, certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, cash
value of life inaurance, and other financial assets. This is a slightly
bzoader definition of non-IRA fínancial assets than found in earlier drafts of
this paper.
ZNet worth is composed of non-IRA financial assets, the current market
value of homes, other properties, businesses and vehicles, minus mortgages on
homes and other properties, minus credit card debt, consumer debt, and other
debt.9
over 8 times the íncrease ín net worth as the median household without an IRA,
and in 1986 had over 4 times as much net worth. The median household with an
IRA also held ,521,695 in NIFA, seven times the NIFA held by the medían
household without an IRA. The median household constrained by the IRA llmit
(and therefore most directly affected by limit changes) held 541,269 in NIFA.
Therefore, while it is clear that the median household in the population
cannot "reshuffle" assets into an IRA, it is equally clear that the median
limit contributor can.l`
(C) Previous Research
Although some of the differences shown in Table 3 can be explained by
differences in observable factors, it is also possible that households with
and without IRAs have different determínants of saving. Nevertheless, most
previous research in this area relies on explicit or ímplicit comparisons of
the saving behavior of householda with IRAs to that of observationally
equívalent households without IRAs.
Using cross-section data, Hubbard (1984) finds that IRA contributors have
hígher ratios of net worth to income than otherwise identical noncontributors.
Feenberg and Skinner (1989) use the panel of IRS tax returns described in
Table 1 and infer from interest and dividend income that, in each of several
ranges of ínitial taxable asset holdings, those taxpayers with IRAs increased
their taxable financial assets (from 1980-1984) by more than those without
IRAs.
1"If households borrow to purchase an IRA, the existence of significant
amounts of non-IRA financial assets is less important to the reshuffling
argument. There appear to be few restrictíons on borrowing to finance an IRA.
The 1992 Tax Guide for College Teachers, for example, devotes a full page [o a
section, "What if You're Short of Cash to Fund Your IRA7" (pp.229-230), that
describes an IRS private letter ruling allowing households to finance their
IRA by borrowíng.10
These results must be interpreted with caution. In particular,
unobservable characteristics such as subjective discount rates and risk
aversion may differ across households with identical observable
characterístics, and these unobservables may be positively correlated with
both IRA choices and other saving. Thus, these findings may merely reflect
heterogeneity in saving behavior, rather than indicating that IRAs raise the
ovarall level of saving.ls
Joines and Manegold (1991) also use the panel of IRS tax returns to
compare the interest and dívídend income of new contríbutors in 1982-84 wíth
the interest and dividend income of the same households in 1979-81, before
they were eligible to contribute. Joines and Manegold suggest that if the
expansion of IRA eligibility stimulated saving, new contributors should have
increased their saving more than a"control" group of taxpayers who
contributed both before and after the 1981 reform. They find that the
comparison provides no evidence that IRA elígibility affects saving. They
also present regression evídence from the pooled panel that suggests the
fraction of IRA contributions financed by reductions in consumption is roughly
0.38 for the full sample and 30.58 if they exclude those households with
ímputed taxable assete greater than 525,000. These studies provide important
evidence on IRAs. At the same time, the tax panel has limitatíons when
studying saving issues in that it lacks direct data on wealth and detailed
information on household characteristics.
1sFeenberg and Skinner (1989) use initíal taxable financial income in an
attempt to control for the household's taste for saving. However, holdings of
taxable financíal assets depend on many other factors, including previous
earning shocks, future earning prospects, inheri[ances, willingness to take
risks, margínal tax rates, health, family size, and age, and hence may not
adequately reflect tastes for savíng.11
Venti and Wise ( 1966, 1987, 1990, 1991) estimate a model of IRA and non-
IRA saving that attempts to allow for both heterogeneity and asset
substitutabilíty. Their maín results are that increasing the annual
contribution limit would raise IRA saving and that only 38-208 of the
increased IRA contributions would be financed by reductíons in other
saving.lfi Roughly 358 would be financed by reductions in taxes, and the
remaining 45-668 would be financed by reductions in consumption.l~ They
conclude that little substitutíon of IRAs and other saving occurs, and that
"contributions to IRAs represent substantial net saving increases" (Venti and
Wise, 1986, p. 594).
Because Venti and Wise present the only formal model of IRAs in the
previous literature, it is worthwhile to highlight several features of their
approach. Fírst, consumers are assumed to allocate income to consumption, IRA
saving, and non-IRA saving according to the following function:
(1)
( i ~
V a (Y-(1-t)S1-SZ)1-a j[o(S1-al)k . ( 1-a)(SZ-aZ)k 1F }
where Y is disposable income, t is the marginal tax rate, S, is IRA saving,
S, is non-IRA saving, and a, ~, k, ai, and a, are parameters.1e Although
16Ventí and Wise (1990, 1991) find that about 38 of the increase in IRA
contributions due to a limit change would come from other assets. These
papers are most comparable to the current one in that thay employ data on the
level of non-IRA saving. Venti and Wise (1986, 1987) place the figure between
78 and 208, but use data on only the sign of non-IRA saving rather than the
Level.
~~Venti and Wíse assume t}int the entlre reduction in taxes ís consumed.
In our simulations reported below, we allow households to save all or a
portion of the tax reduction.
1sThe first term equals consumption and ís derived from the budget
constraint.12
this "allocation functíon" approach yields closed-form solutions for IRA and
other saving, it is not clear what underlying utility function would be
consistent with maxímization of (1).19
Second, as Deaton (1987) notes, indivídual attributes that are presumably
important determinants of saving behavior--e.g., assets or age--do not have
first order effects in the saving equations. Attributes enter only through
interactions (via n and ~) with income, and thus affect only the marginal
propensity to save rather than the level of saving directly.Zo
Third, the effects of changes in the annual contribution limit depend on
parameters (k, a, ~, and correlations among the error terms) that are
estimated on the whole sample. These effects therefore rest on comparisons,
which in this case are complicated and nonlinear, between IRA contríbutors and
otherwise ídentical households who do not contribute. Consequently, the work
ís subject to the same problem as that of Hubbard (1984) and Feenberg and
Skinner (1989): unless there is a way to ensure that unobservable tastes for
savíng are not correlated with the decision to buy an IRA, their results may
u~~~~.~~.:~- -he degree of substitutability between IRAs and other savíng.
The importance of this problem can best be seen by examining the argument
tht~t Cor IRAS to be a perfect suhstítute for other saving, eve saver would
have to hold an IRA (Venti and Wíse 1990, p. 676). Sínce only about 20B of
their sample held IRAs, it is not surprising that they reject the hypothesis
of perfect substitutability. However it is clearly possible that a large
1sAlternatively, if V is meant to represent preferences explicitly, (1)
implíes that utílity ís obtained directly from the level of savíng rather than
from the quantity of goods consumed.
ZoIndividual characteristics, X, enter the model through o and Q, whích
in most specifications are restricted to lie between 0 and 1 using the normal
distribution: a-~(Xa) and ~-~(Xb).13
portion of IRA holders (e.g., those with large amounts of NIFA or who are
older than 59) find IRAs to be perfect substitutes for other saving, while
other households do not.
In the next sections, we develop and estimate an alternative model of IRA
and saving that addresses these concarns.Zl
III. Modelling IRAs and Savine
This section develops a simple model of IRAs and other saving, where
saving decisions are derived explicitly from maximization of a utility
function that depends only on current and expected future consumption. The
model captures several important institutional features of IRAs: the annual
contribution limit, the penalty for early withdrawal, tax-free accrual of
interest, and tax-deductible contributions. We use the model to illustrate
several analytical issues and to motivate the empirical framework used in
sectíon IV.
Consider an individual who lives for three periods. In each períod j,
she chooses consumption (C~), and makes contributions to IRA saving (S~) and
other saving (Só). Non-IRA saving earns Ro (gross) per period.
Contributions to IRAs earn Rr (gross) per period if they are held until she
reaches the third períod and 1 per period if cashed in earlier. Let Rz ~ Ro
~ 1. IRA contributions made in the first period yield a lower return than
ordinary savíng if withdrawn in the aecond period but yíeld a higher return
Z10ther analyses of IRAs include Andrews and Bradford (1988), Burman,
Cordes, and Ozanne (1990), Collins and Wykoff (1987), Galper and Byce (1986),
Gravelle (1991), Huizinga (1991), Kotlikoff (1990), I.ong (1990), 0'Neil and
Thompson (1987), Skinner (1992), and Summers (1986).14
than other savíng if held until the third.ZZ The maximum IRA contributíon
allowed per period is L.
At the beginning of each period, the consumer receíves labor income Yj.
We set Y~ to zero for símplícity and assume that Y, is uncertaín and the
consumer cannot borrow. Thus, if the realization of Y2 ís suffíciently low,
the consumer will have to cash in first period IRA saving early and thus íncur
a penalty.Z3 There is no other uncertainty ín the model; in particular,
rates of return are certain. The model also assumes there are no transactions
costs associated with IRAs, though some ímplicatíons of relaxíng this
assumption are noted below.
Define the consumer's available resources at the beginning of each períod
as Wj. The consumer's problem in period j , j-1,2,3, is to
(2)
(3)
Max Vj(W~) ~ U(Cj) 4 r-Ej ~Vj,l(W~,1) } subject to
~Si ~ Só 1
Sá ? ~, Si ~ ~, So ?-SóRo, SÍ ?-SÍ ,
(4a) Y~ - Cj t Só ~ SÍ(1-t) if SÍ ? 0,
(46) Y~ - C~ a So~ t SÍ if SÍ G 0,
(Sa) W1 ' Y1~
zZThe penalty for early withdrawal in this framework is the interest
earned from period 1 to períod 2. Nothing of substance would change if the
penalty were a percentage of the early withdrawal, as is actually done.
z3The model can be generalized to include borrowíng. Suppose the
household could borrow at gross rate RB. If RH G RI, the household would
borrow in the first period to finance IRA purchases and IRAs would not raise
saving. If RB ~(RI)2, the substitutability of IRAs and other saving ís the
same as íf the household could not borrow. The household would prefer to
withdraw IRA funds in period 2 rather than borrow. If RI G RB G(RI)Z, the
cost of a bad draw of YZ would be reduced relative to the no-borrowíng case.
Thus, IRAs would be better substitutes for other saving than predicted by the
model.15
(Sb) Wz ` Y2 t SOIRO t Si ~
(Sc) Ws ` Só(Ro)Z , SóRo ' SiíRI)2 ' SÍRI íf SÍ ? 0,
(Sd) W3 - So(Ro)Z . SoRo ~ SÍ(RI)Z a SÍ (RI)Z if SÍ ~ 0, and
(Se) W~ - 0,
where V is the value functíon, p is the subjective rate of time preference,
E~ is the expectation operator conditional on all information available at
the beginning of period j, and t is the tax rate, which is assumed to be
constant over time. Borrowing constraints are captured in (3). Equations
(4a) and (4b) are simply the per-period budget constraints: íncome must be
allocated either to consumption or to net contributíons to saving. These
constraínts allow already existing assets to be shifted from one form of
saving to another. Equations (Sa)-(Sd) describe the evolution of available
resources for consumption.
To ganerate closed form solutions, we assume that utility is given by
U(Cj) --(k-C~)2. The quadratic specificatíon has been widely used,
particularly in the macroeconomics líterature. It ís the only commonly used
functional form that generates closed-form solutions to the problem above.
Nevertheless, quadratic utility imposes important limitations; for example, it
precludes the existence of precautionary saving. Thus, in the current model
the expected level of future income affects current saving but the variabilíty
of that expectation does not.2` Quadratic utility also has the
counterfactual implication that wealthier households insure more heavily than
the poor against the same risk and that the wealthy hold more riskless assets
and fewer rísky assets than the poor. It is difficult to assess the
Z~No existing empirical model addresses how the variability of income
affects IRA choíces. For a símulation model that incorporates this effect,
see Engen and Gale (1991).16
importance of this implication in the current setting, because neither IRAs
nor other saving represent safe assets and either can be made the more
rísky.25
The formal solution to thís problem ís deríved in Appendix A.
Intuitively, the solution takes the followíng form. In the thírd period, the
consumer simply consumes all remaining resources. At the beginning of period
2, Yz is revealed; the consumer then chooses consumption and contributions
to IRAs and other savíng. The portfolio choice in thís period is simple: the
first SL of new saving or of previously existing non-IRA financial assets
(SóRo) should be placed in an IRA, with the remainder going to other saving.
IRA contributions and other saving are perfect substitutes in the second
period because there is no prospect of having to make an early withdrawal.Zfi
If low Y, forces the consumer to dissave, all dissaving should occur through
non-IRA assets until they are fully depleted.
In the first period, the consumer has both an interesting consumption
choice and an interesting portfolio choice. Although attracted by the
potentially high rate of return on IRAs, she may be deterred by the prospect
of having to withdraw funds in period 2 and incurring a penalty. As shown in
Appendix A, first-order conditions for first period saving choices are of the
following form:
ZSIn structural estimation with quadratic utility, some households may be
in a position of havíng negatíve marginal utility of consumption. This issue
is discussed ín section IV. Zeldes (1989) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)
provide additional comments on quadratic utility.
Z6With transactions costs of openíng an IRA, i t would no longer
necessarily be true that the fírst SL of saving should go into IRAs. Once an
IRA had been opened, however, IRAs would remain perfect substitutes for other
saving in the second period.17
(6) SI - ~ik ' ózWi ' ~a ' 9~So
So - aik ' azG~i ' aa ' o~Si ~
where the a's and ~'s are complicated functions of the parameters of the
model and expectations.Z~ Solving the system for So and Sr gíves
equations of the form
(7)
SI - ëlk . bZWI i ó3
So - ó~k . ó5W1 , óe ,
where the b's depend on the a's and ~'s.
Equation (7) represents the Sr and So that would occur in the
absence of any contribution limits on SI. If actual Sz is constrained to
lie between zero and L, the correspondíng So equation when the Sr
constraint is bindíng is determined by substituting the constrained value of





SO - Qlk a QzWl a Q3
if Si 5 0
SI - SI - ólk ` óz[Jl ` ó3 ~ if 0~ Si 5 L
So - b~k . byWl f bfi
SI - L
~- olk ~ o~l ~ 03 - Q`L if SÍ z L
Equations (8)-(10) provide for joint determination of IRA and other
savíng, explicitly incorporating the effects of the contribution limit and
implicítly incorporating (through the maximization procedure) the effects of
the early wíthdrawal penalty and other features of IRAs. These equations can
be used to illustrate several points.
First, only índividuals that already contribute the maximum amount are
Z~Superscripts on the saving variables have been omitted for simplicity.18
affected by changes in L.28 Second, comparative static effects will in
general depend on p, which ís typically unobserved.ZS Therefore,
differences in unobserved characteristics across households should affect the
coeffícients in the saving equations. To allow for the possible existence of
such dífferences between households with IRAs and those without IRAs, we show
ín Appendix A that (10) can be rewritten as
So . á~k . b3W1 . bfi t n~(Si -L)
1f Si t L
SI i L ~
The model is then given by (8), (9), and (11). Equations (11) and (9)
describe IRA holders that contribute the maximum and less than the maximum,
respectively. For both groups, So is the same linear function of k and
W1, with an added term for limit contributors, reflecting the spillover of
excess desired IRA saving (S;-L) into non-IRA saving. Equation (8) provides
a different functíon of k and wl for the So of non-contributors. Thus,
the model explicitly allows for differences in savíng behavior between
households with IRAs and observationally equivalent households without IRAs.
ZBlncorporating transactions costs would allow the possibilíty of
discontinuous choices, whereby a very small increase in IRA límits could cause
households to change their contributions from zero to SL. We have no way of
assessing empirícally the importance of this possibílity.
If the model were extended to 4 or more períods, the magnitude of the
first-period saving response to a change in contribution limits would fall as
the likelihood of a bad draw on uncertaín future income increases (because
there would be more periods in which IRAs are illiquid and income ís risky).
However, the model would still yield equations of the form given by (8)-(10)
although the precise formulas for each a and ~ would differ from the 3-períod
model.
ZsFor example, in (8) dSo~dWl - oZ, where a2 is a function of p and other
parameters of the model. Thus, two households with different subjective
díscount rates would have different savings responses to exogenous increases
in wealth.19
The model indicates that the substitutability of IRA contributions and
other saving should rise with age (IRAs are perfect substitutes in period 2
and imperfect substitutes in period 1) and with non-IRA assets (higher assets
imply less likelihood of having a second-períod income draw so low as to have
to withdraw IRA funds early). Substitutability is measured by a`. For
example, if a,, - 0, none of the excess desired IRA saving would be placed in
non-IRA financial assets. If ae - 1, all of the excess desired IRA saving
would be placed ín non-IRA fínancial assets. Due to private wealth effects of
IRAs, a~ can exceed 1(see also Vanti and Wise, 1991, Figure 1).30
IV. ~,p ipirical Analysis
(A) Snecífication
An empirical specification consistent with the model above is
(12) SÍ - X~ a u
0 íf SÍ 5 0
(13) SI ~ X~ t u if OcSÍ ~L
L íf SÍ z L
Xyl . cl if SÍ 5 0
(14) So - X72 i c2 tf 0~ Sj t L
X72 t 9(Si -L) t cZ if SÍ z L,
where Sl is desired IRA saving, Sr (So) is actual IRA (other) saving, X is a
vector of household characteristics, r~ - bX measures the spillover of excess
desíred IRA saving into other saving, ~, yl, yy and b are parameter vectors to
3oMore generally, a dollar of foregone consumption placed into an IRA is
worth (ltr)r after T years. A dollar placed into a taxable account will be
worth (ltr(1-t))T. The maximum value of a~ occurs for a"target saver" and is
the ratio of the value of a dollar of IRA saving divided by the value of a
dollar of conventional saving. If r-.10, t-.3, and T-15, for example, the
maximum value of a` is 1.51. If T-30, the maximum value is 2.29.20
be estimated, L is the upper limit on IRA contributions, and u, cl and ez are
errors.31 The specificatíon corresponds closely to (8), (9) and (11), where
k is interpreted as a vector of household characteristics. Equations (12)-
(14) provide for joint estimation of IRA and other saving, incorporatíng the
features of IRAs described above. Because our 2-year panel dataset on
household balance sheets yields a cross-sectional dataset on saving, we cannot
estimate structural parameters, such as subjective discount rates and k's,
which may vary across individuals. Instead, the structural parameters are
embedded in the estimated ~'s, ry's, and ó's.3z
The model distinguishes sharply between IRA contributors and
noncontributors. Unlike previous researchers, we do not impose equal
coefficients and error variances on the two groups. Instead, we measure
substitutability by comparing limit contributors to non-limit ("interior")
contríbutors. The only dífference between these two groups is that the former
has an excess demand for IRAs that is allowed to influence non-IRA saving.
Comparing limit contributors to interior contríbutors, rather than to non-
contributors, controls for a specific type of heterogeneity where households
with IRAs and households without IRAs have different determinants of saving.
As the model is formulated, we are able to test the validity of this
dístínctíon below.
Errors are assumed to be additive and distributed bivariate normal.
31We follow the prevíous literature in setting the lower limit on IRA
contributions equal to zero, so the empirical model distinguishes between IRA
contributors and non-contributors rather than households with and without
IRAs.
3zWithout the structural parameters of the theoretical model, it is
impossible to address the issue of whether households are estimated to have
negative margínal utility of consumption.zl
Although there are 3 possible error terms, only two will correspond to any
partícular household. The specification leads to a likelihood function with
three branches corresponding to the probabilities that the observed value at
So occurs and (i) S; 5 0, (ii) 0 ~ S; ~ L, and (111) SÍ x L. The full
specification of the errors and the resulting likelíhood function are
presented in Appendix B.
Non-IRA saving, So, is composed of saving in non-IRA financial assets
(checking, saving, and money market accounts, certificates of deposit, stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, cash value of life insurance, and other financial assets)
minus increases in credít card debt and in loans for items other than
mortgages, home repairs, automobiles, or real estate.33 As with IRA saving,
we calculate an assumed constant flow of saving in each category of asset or
liability needed to achieve the observed balance in 1986, given the observed
balance in 1983 and an average rate of return on each category of asset and
liability. Details of this calculation and documentation of the interest rate
assumptions are given in Appendix C. The resulting dataset is a cross-section
on IRA saving, non-IRA saving, and household demographic and financial
characteristics. Later in this section we describe sensitivity analysis, a
portion of which focusses on measurement error.
The independent variables in the IRA and non-IRA saving equations are
chosen to be consistent with previous theoretical and empirical studies of
saving and IRAs. Precise defínitions are given in Appendix C and summary data
are presented in Appendix Table 1. Independent varíables refer to 1983 values
33IRA5 would seem to be most substitutable with these categories of
assets and liabilities, rather than, for example, housing or land. Venti and
Wise use a similar definítion for similar reasons.22
except for education (whích is an average of 1983 and 1986 levels) and age
(which is measured in 1986).
Standard formulations of the life-cycle model show the importance of age,
income and wealth in determíníng saving. We include age and age squared to
capture possible hump-shaped saving profiles, current income, and
disaggregated components of wealth (non-IRA financial assets, illiquíd assets
and debt) in the empírical specification of IRAs and other saving. For a
particular houaehold, hígher asset levels encourage increased consumption and
thus reduced saving, holding other factors (e.g., income) constant. Across
households, however, differences in inítial asset holdings may be correlated
with tastes for saving, controlling for other factors.3ó Thus, the predicted
effect of assets on saving is ambiguous. Debt also has a theoretically
ambiguous relationship to IRA purchases. To the extent that households are
financing IRA purchases by borrowing, there should be a positive relationship;
to Che extent that increased debt payments make IRAs less attractive, due to
the latter's illiquídity, there should be a negative relationship. Households
with large amounts of nonlíquid assets all else being equal, may find IRAs,
another nonliquid asset, less attractive.
We follow previous empirical studies by including a dummy variable for
pensions and data on demographic factors, namely the education of the
household head and family size. Moze highly educated people may be more
financially sophisticated and thereby find the transactions costs of IRAs less
burdensome than do others. In addition, differences in education may be
cozrelated with dífferences in discount rates, and thus with tastes for
3'Of course, many other factors will affect assets holdings. Some of
these are mentioned in footnote 15.23
saving. In either case, more highly educated households would be expected to
hold higher IRA balances. Other things equal, those with larger families may
face higher current expenditures and thus have a lower propensíty to tie up
funds ín an illiquid IRA.
We include a dummy variable for whether the household had an IRA ín 1983
as an additíonal proxy for a household's past saving behavior and financial
sophistication. This variable alao indicates that the household has
previously incurred the transactions costs associated wíth starting an IRA.
In some sensitivity runs, we include lndicator variables for whether the
household reports facing borrowing constraints and whether the household owns
its own home.35 Households who face borrowíng constraints should be less
likely to invest in illiquid assets like IRAs and may have low propensities to
save (high propensities to borrow). Home ownership may be important because
households may not want to tie up funds in an IRA until they have purchased a
home.
Holding other varíables constant, the spillover effect of excess desired
IRA saving into non-IRA saving is measured by q. To account for heterogeneity
in the model, q is modelled as a linear function of the same covariates as the
IRA and non-IRA saving equations.3ó Parameters are identified in the model
through the functional form, which is suggested by the theoretical framawork,
and by the variation in IRA limits due to variation in marital status and
3sA household is considered borrowing constrained if it reported that it
had been turned down for credit in the previous few years or that it had not
applied for credit because it thought it would be turned down. See Jappelli
(1990) for an analysís using this information.
36Thus, unlike the empirical model of Gale and Scho12 (1990), we impose
no ad hoc exclusion restrictions in the parameterization of ~, 71, and ryZ and
drop only the constant term on q.24
employment across households.
In estimating the model, we exclude households from the sample if: the
head is 24 or younger, the head changed marítal status during 1983-86, or the
head or spouse was self-employed. These exclusions are due eíther to
difficulties in calculating IRA contributions or to data limitations
(see footnote 8). We also exclude households in which the head was 65 or
older in 1983 to maintain comparability with previous studies and to avoid the
added complexitíes of modelling saving by the elderly.37 However, for this
group, IRAs should be a very good substitutes for other saving since there is
no early withdrawal penalty. Therefore, excludíng the elderly presumably
biases our results away from finding strong substitutability.
Finally, to reduce the extreme range of saving in the sample,38 we
exclude households if the absolute value of non-IRA saving or dissavíng
exceeded 5100,000 over the three year period. This restriction is potentially
the most troubling, due to problems arisíng from selecting on an endogenous
variable. However, for households saving more than 5100,000, limit changes
are likely to be inframarginal. Results for other thresholds are presented ín
sensitivíty tests, described below. Appendix Table 2 shows the number of
households excluded by each selection criterion.
(B) Coefficient Estimates
Table 4 presents results for eatimation of (12)-(14) wíth a saving
~~For example, see Bernheim (1991) or Hurd (1987, 1989) and the
references therein.
3sThe change in real wealth ranged from less than -530 million to more
than S30 million over the sample (Avery and Kennickell (1988b)).24a







































































































(mean log-likelíhood - -5.51397, n - 1463)25
threshold of SLOO,OO0.39 The coefficient estimates in the IRA equation (the
~'s) are generally consistent with previous empirical studies and ~priori
theorizing. IRA purchases are positively and significantly correlated wíth
income and education. As in Venti and Wise (1988), we find that households
with pensions contribute more to IRAs. The quadratic terms on age indicate
that IRA contributiona increase with age until the head of household reaches
47, whereafter contributions decline, conditioning on other attributes. We
find that households with more debt contribute more to IRAs, consistent with
the possibility the households are borrowing to finance their IRAs.~o We
also find that households who already had an IRA contribute sígnificantly more
to IRAs between 1983 and 1986, as would be expected given that the variable
indicates that the household had already absorbed the transactions costs
associated wíth establishing an IRA and had demonstrated a preference for
saving through IRAs. Family size, non-IRA financíal asse[ balances, and
nonliquid asset balances ara negatively correlated with IRA purchases, but are
not statistically significant.
In the non-IRA saving equations (the ryl's for households without IRAs and
the yZ's for households with IRAs), the quadratic term in age suggests that
saving rises at an increasing rate during one's working life, though these
coefficíents are not statistically significant.~l Non-IRA saving ís
positívely and significantly correlated with current income. The estimates
imply that households not contributing to IRAs save ~.06 out of every
3eResults were estimated using a wide variety of different starting
values to ensure, to the best of our ability, that the reported zesults
reflect global maxima.
"oAlso see Kotlikoff, 1990, p. 240 for a discussion of this point.
61Reca11 that the sample omits households older than 65 in 1983.26
additional dollar of current income, while the corresponding fígure for the
non-IRA saving of ínterior IRA contributors is ~.08. These fígures are
consistent with the low rates of household saving observed in the U.S.
The level of nonliquid assets in 1983 is negatively and signifícantly
related to savíng in financial forms for noncontributors. This result may be
related to the effects of homeownezship. Households without homes tend to
save in flnancial forms to accumulate a downpayment. After the home is
purchased, households will have a relatively large nonliquid asset,
conditíoning on other attributes, and will then appear to have low levels of
financial saving.
The coefficient on non-IRA financial asset balances in 1983 is negative
and highly significant for contributors. This suggests that as a descriptíve
matter, saving in non-IRA financial assets is negatively correlated with
previously accumulated levels of financial assets for IRA contributors. The
level of debt in 1983 is statistically significant and enters with a posítive
sign. This may reflect the fact that indebted households must save to repay
debts. It is also consistent with a model where households that save took
advantage of the interest deductibility of debt during this period to engage
ín tax azbitrage. The remaining coefficients are statistically insignificant,
though for both IRA contributors and noncontributors the 1983 IRA dummy is
positive while larger families saved less than otherwise equivalent
households.
The coefficients on q, along with the correlation and variances of the
errors determine the substitutability of IRA and non-IRA saving. The
estimates show that higher non-IRA financial asset balances significantly
raise the substitutability of IRAs and other forms of saving. Thís is27
consistent with the argument that households with higher NIFA are in a better
position to reshuffle existing assets or redirect new saving that would have
been done anyway. Several other effects have point estimates of the expected
sígn, but only two are statistically significant. The quadratic expression
wíth age indicates that substitutability rises wíth age once a household
reaches age 28.~Z Substitutability also rises wíth education, consistent
with more educated people finding transactions costs less burdensome or,
possibly, havíng lower discount rates. Highly leveraged households (with
hígher ínterest service payments) find illiquid IRAs to be less substítutable
with other saving. IRAa are also leas aubstitutable with other saving Sf the
household has a pension or previously made an IRA contribution. The latter
effect is consistent with IRAs being funded from transferring assets or
redirecting saving. Higher valuea of current income negatively and
significantly affect substítutability. Higher íncomes tend to be more
variable ín the SCF.63 It appears, therefore, that once we condition on non-
IRA fínancial assets, income variability (whlch is posltívely correlated with
income) and the associated need for liquíd saving may reduce the
substltutability of IRAs and other savíng.
(C) Effects of Limit Chan e g-s
To help interpret the parameter estimates, we analyze the effects of a
hypothetical change in the annual contribution limit, supposing that the
limits were increased by 51,000 per year for each household. The new limits
"ZIn the weighted sample used for tables 1-3, 2.68 of the IRA
contributors are 27 or younger.
~3The SCF provides separate observations on 1983, 1984 and 1985 income.
The standard deviation of annual income over the 3 years increases
monotonically from s1,279, for households with average incomes between SO-
510,000, to 551,469 for households with average incomes that exceed 5100,000.28
would be ~3,000 for singles, 53,250 for married couples wíth one worker, and
~5,000 for married couples wíth two workers.
Raising the limít will raise IRA contributions. These new contributions
are ultímately financed by a combination of reduced non-IRA saving, reduced
taxation due to the deductibility of IRA contributions, and changes in
consumptíon. We analyze these changes in three steps. First, for each
household, we simulate predicted values for Si and So using the estimated
coeffícients and errors drawn from the estimated distributíons (formulas are
given ín Appendix B). Second, we calculate the change in IRA saving and non-
IRA saving given the change ín the contribution limit, but holding taxes and
other varíables constant. This is the question the model estimated above is
best designed to answer, and, as shown below, will provide an estimate of the
maximum net saving effect. However, those who raise their IRA contributions
wíll also receive a tax break, which must be either saved or consumed. Thus,
the third step is to calculate the associated tax saving and to account for
how the tax cut is spent. Calculating the tax saving is straightforward;"
to account for how the tax cut is allocated to consumption or saving, we
compare alternative simple rules, as described below.~5
Simulations were done 25 times for each household. The average increase
in IRA contríbutions, across the sample, is 5174.75. Holding taxes and other
varlables constant, an average of 5171.07, or approxímately 988, of the
'~A tax calculator is used that simulates the household's tax return,
using income and demographic characteristics reported in the SCF. See Scholz
(1992) for a more detailed discussion of the tax calculator.
~Sllenti and Wise follow the first two steps, but treat the reductíon in
tax payments as not influencing saving. Because the reduction in tax payments
must create changes in either consumption or saving, this treatment
effectively assumes that the tax cut is consumed.29
increased IRA contributions would be financed by a fall ín non-IRA prívate
saving.4e
Reductíons ín consumption would finance a maximum of 28 of the increased
IRA contributions. This is shown by the following calculations. The
slmulations indicate that tax reductlons (lncreased public dissaving) would
represent about 318 of the increased IRA contributions.~~ If households
saved the whole tax reduction in the firat year, reduced taxes would finance
318, reduced non-IRA private saving would finance about 678 (-988-318), and
reduced prívate consumption would finance the remaíning 28 of the increased
IRA contributions. Thus, public and private dissaving would account for 988
of the increased IRA contributions and net increases in national saving would
account for only 28.
Alternatively, if households consumed half of the tax cut in the first
year, non-IRA saving would fall by about 838 (-988-158) of the increased IRA
contributions, while tax cuts would again finance 318. Consumption would
actually rise (and natíonal saving would fall) by 148 of the increased
contributions. While these estimates imply very little, íf any, positive
effect of IRAs on national saving, they should not be considered extreme in
the sense of being the híghest estimates theoretically possible. As díscussed
'BThe restriction ry- 0 can be rejected at very high confidence levels.
The likelihood ratío test statistic is 68.44. The 998 critical value for 1
degree of freedom is 6.63. The constraint can also be interpreted as imposing
ten restrictions, in whích case the 18 critical value is 23.21.
"~These calculations are partial equilibrium and consider only the
effects of the individual income tax. Feldstein (1992), starting from the
assumption that IRAs significantly stimulate private saving, suggests that
capital deepening, resulting from increased national saving, w111 increase
corporate tax receipts. In his simulations this corporate tax effect will
partíally and in some cases completely offset tha loas 1n personal income tax
revenues.30
in footnote 30, the effect of IRAs on national saving for a"target saver"
depends on rates of return, tax rates, and holding periods. For example,
using returns of 88, the tax rates and age distribution of límit contributors
ín the sample, and assuming that IRAs are cashed in (lump sum) at age 65, non-
IRA saving by target savers would tall by 1518 oi' the lncreased 1NA
contributions. If instead returns are 148, the figure rises to 2238.
(D) Sansitivity Analysis
We have performed sensitivity analysis along a number of dimensions.4e
These include varying the sample saving thresholds and independent variables,
modelling the effect of "false constraints," and examining the effects of
measurement error. The results of this analysis are described below and
summarized in Table 5.
Saving Thresholds
The first row of Table S shows the effect, discussed in the previous
section, of astimating and simulating the model with saving thresholds of
tS100,000. Rows 2 and 3 show the results for saving thresholds of t575,000
and t5200,000. Using the lower threshold does not signifícantly alter the
qualitative conclusions. Incorporating the higher threshold leads to
implausibly high estimates of substitution, which makes it clear that we do
not adequately capture the saving behavior of the extremely rich.`B This may
be a result of different saving responses to observed characteristics among
the extremely wealthy. Menchik and Wiesbrod (1987), for example, report
similar difficultíes in modelling the charítable behavior of the extremely
~BResults for all runs described in the paper are presented in a
supplemental appendix, available from the authors on request.
`9Increasingly large and untenable amounts of substitutíon are obtained
as the saving threshold is increased to ts250,000 and tS300,000.30a
Table 5
Sensitivity Analysis:
Raising the Annual Contribution Límit by 510001
ModelZ Average Increase Maximum Reduction Maximum Percentage of
in IRA Saving in non-IRA IRA Contrlbutions





























1For eacti slmulation, tlie change in IRA saving and non-IRA saving is
calculated after increasing the contribution limit by 51000, holdíng other
variables constant, The average of the changes is reported.
zThe model specifications are described in the text.
3The maximum effect on national saving is calculated assuming the
entíre tax cut caused by the increase in IRA contributions is saved.31
wealthy relative to the rest of the population. Menchik and David (1983)
estimate that bequest elasticities are very different for very high income
households than for others. It is also likely that the more complicated
portfolio arrangements of extremely wealthy houaeholds are not adaquately
captured by the relatively conventional asset and liability categories that we
use to calculate saving.
Indenendent Variables
Results for the model estimated without the 1983 IRA dummy variable are
shown in the fourth row.SO Dropping this variable had no effect on the signs
and little effect on the magnitudes and signiflcance of the remaining
coefficients. The fifth row of the table summarizes results from a model
where, in addition to the variables used in Table 4, dummy variables for home
ownership and being liquidity conatraíned are included. As expected, having a
home is posítively and significantly associated with IRA purchases while being
turned down for a loan or discouraged from borrowing is negatively and
signifícantly correlated with saving in the form of IRAs. These runs generate
smaller net saving effects of limít changes than the specificatíon shown ín
the first row of Table 5.
False Constraints
Feenberg and Skínner (1989) report that a large number of married
couples, with legal contribution limits of 52,250 or 54,000, contribute
exactly 52,000 to IRAs. They question whether households are being affected
by "false" or non-statutory constraínts. If so, households that are not at
the statutory limit may well respond to changes in the límit. Whether they
would respond by increasing overall saving or reallocating their saving is an
so~is and all other results below are based on the 5100,000 threshold.32
open question. In any case, our model as currently structured would not
capture these responses, which could bias our estimates.sl
To test whether the existence of falsely constraíned households affects
our conclusíons, we estimate and simulate the model under two regimes.
Because our IRA contributions variable ís constructed from data on asset
balances, we do not observe the bunching that Feenberg and Skinner find.
Thus, to capture "modest false constraínts," we move the límit to 52,000 for
any couple with a statutozy limit of 52,250. The only households whose status
is affected are those with a legal limit of 52,250 whose estimated
contribution was between 52,000 and 52,250. As shown in the sixth row of
Table 5, imposing modest false constraints has little effect on our results:
the maximum savíng effect falls to -58 from 28.
To capture "severe false constraints" we take two additional steps.
Recognizing that we may measure saving with error, we classify any one-earner
couple with average IRA contributions above 51,900 as being constrained by the
contribution limit. Similarly, we classlfy any two-earner couple with average
contributíons between 51,900 and 52,350 as being a limit contributor. This
procedure undoubtedly misclassifies some households that know they are not
constrained by the limit, but nevertheless, serves as a useful check of model
robustness in light of the bunching observed in tax return data. The results
for this specification are given in row seven. The maxímum net saving effect
increases from 28 to 358. If the tax cut ís consumed in the first year, as
S~A similar issue will arise with households that may be constrained in
one period but unconstrained in others. We would classify the household as
unconstrained (over the 3-year period covered ín our data), but increases in
contribution limíts could affect the saving of that household in the year they
were constrained. With our data we are unable to assess the importance of
this effect.33
Ven[í and Wise assume, only 48 (-358-318) of the increased IRA contribution
due to a limit change would reflect increases ín national saving.
Measurement Error
As discussed previously, we calculate saving from asset and liability
balances ín 1983 and 1986 and their corresponding average rates of return,
assumed to be constant across households. If rates of return vary across
households (see, for example, Yitzhaki, 1987), the dependent variables, IRA
and non-IRA saving, will be measured with error. This raises two distinct
íssues. First, errors in calculating IRA contributions will cause households
to be misclassified into regimes. Stapleton and Young (1984) discuss a
similar problem in the context of a single equation Tobit model. Second, Sf
households that earn higher returns on one asset also earn higher returns on
other assets, the errors in the IRA and non-IRA saving equations may be
spuriously correlated, which, when combined with the misclassification of
regíme, may bias the coefficient estimates.
These issues arise because in constructíng the saving data we have
assumed that each household receíves the same rate of return, wíthin each
asset and liability category. Our general strategy, therefore, is to use
artificial data to simulate exactly the same type of ineasurement error that we
impose on the data. We eatimate the model with data whare all households
receive the same rate of return on each asset and liability category. A
comparison of these es[imates, with those generated from equivalent artificial
data that contain household-specific returna on assets and liabilitiea
provides evidence on the dírection and magnitude of the measurement error
biases that arise from our methodology.
The simulations proceed in several steps. We first use the coefficient34
estimates from Table 4, random draws from the estimated error distributíon,
and the independent variables to construct fitted values of IRA and non-IRA
savíng for each household. Second, we generate a household-specific rate of
return for each asset and liabilíty category. For each categozy we assume the
rate of return is distributed normally across households with means equal to
the average return described in Appendix C and standard devíations discussed
below. Third, using the fítted saving variables and the household-specific
interest rates, we calculate a constructed value for 1986 IRA balances and
non-IRA asset balances using equatíon C-1 in Appendix C.52 As mentioned
earlier, measurement error occurs because we do not observe the random
component of returns. We replicate this problem ín the fourth step of the
simulation by using the constructed 1986 IRA and non-IRA asset balances from
step 3, observed 1983 IRA and non-IRA asset balances from the data, and
averaee, rather than household-specific interest rates to recalculate IRA and
non-IRA saving.
Evidence on how measurement error affects our results is obtained by
comparing (i) the benchmark estimates, that ís, the model estimates using
fitted IRA and non-IRA saving described in step 1 and (ií) the recalculated
estimates, that is, the model estimates using the recalculated IRA and non-IRA
saving variables described in step 4. These comparisons suggest that our
estimates in Table 4 and 5 of the net saving effects of IRA limít changes are
biased downward. The key parameter in assessing the magnitude of the bias is
the standard deviation of the household-specific rate of return for each asset
SZThe constructed 1986 non-IRA asset balances are calculated using a
weighted average of the new random interest rates, with household specific
weights based on the composition of assets in 1963. This weighting procedure
ia innocuous for the purposes of the simulatíon.35
and liabílity category. With a standard deviation of 1 percentage point, the
recalculated estimates of the maximum reduction in non-IRA prívate saving
(column 2 of Table 5) are roughly 88 higher than the benchmark estimates.
With a standard deviation of S percentage points, the recalculated estimates
of the maximum reduction in non-IRA private saving are 188 hígher than the
benchmark. When thís 188 figure is applied to the estimates shown in the
first row of Table 5, the percentage of new IRA contributions that would
represent increases ín national saving (if the entire tax cut is saved),
resulting from an increase in contribution limits, would rlse from 28 to 208.
If all of the tax reduction were consumed, natíonal saving would fall by 5.11
for every additíonal dollar contributed to IRAs.s3
Assessing the Model
In order to gauge the reliabílity of the underlying model, Table 6
presents data on how well the model fits saving patterns by income category.
The fírst panel shows that the model predicts the percentages of IRA holders
and limit contributors fairly well, both overall and by income class. The
second panel shows there is a close correspondence for the percentage of
savers in the sample and the percentage of IRA holders that save positive
amounts. Similar data with similar results are reported by Venti and Wise.
The third panel shows model fit for the level of saving. Not
surprisingly, the model fit here is not as precise as ín the first two panels.
It is difficult, however, to know how accurate the fit is relative to other
S3Making the measurement error adjustment to the "severe" false
constraints estímate leads to our largest estímate of the largest net saving
effect of IRAs, 478. Thís may appear to be similar to the Venti and Wise
estimates of 45 to 66 percent. However, when we follow theír assumption about
the dispensation of the tax reduction, the comparable false-constraints-
measurement-error estímate is 168.Table 6: Model Fit by Income Class, Unweighted
Income Class Percentage with IRA Percentage wíth IRA at Limít
(3-years) Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
(thousands) Number
0-50 404 15.1 7.4 2.7 1.2
50-75 273 22.7 19.8 4.4 2.6
75-100 276 24.6 31.1 5.8 7.6
100-150 297 30.3 39.1 8.1 8.4
150-200 115 43.5 64.3 11.3 17.4
200-300 66 63.6 75.8 15.2 40.9
300t 52 73.1 73.1 28.8 23.1
Total 1,483 27.7 30.2 6.8 7.9
Income Class Percentage wlth Sp~O 8 of IRA holders w~ Sd0
(3-years) Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
(thousands)
0-50 50.2 49.8 47.5 56.7
50-75 51.3 58.6 51.6 51.9
75-100 59.4 63.4 54,4 53.5
100-150 55.6 59.9 53.3 57.8
150-200 57.4 67.8 54.0 68.9
200-300 68.2 63.6 69.0 54.0
300t 50.0 46.2 44.7 42.1
Total 54.6 57.9 53.3 56.3
Income Class Non-IRA Saving Non-IRA Saving of IRA Holders
(3-years) Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
(thousands)
0-50 -S566 5506 -5961 -g433
50-75 421 1,864 -2,872 1,846
75-100 3,027 2,751 1,191 472
100-150 2,605 2,432 1,822 2,383
150-200 2,631 7,028 1,952 7,985
200-300 11,552 4,774 11,350 489
300t -1,285 2,320 -6,615 -1,068
Total 1,681 2,319 806 2,18436
models, since data on model fit by level of saving have not been reported in
prevíous IRA studíes.s`
Are Contributors and Non-Contributors Alike7
Previous researchers have estimated substltutability parameters using the
entire sample of IRA holders and non-IRA holders. That model arises as a
special case of our model, with ryl - ry2 and ol - oZ. Thus, the restriction
that the two groups have the same response to observed determinants can be
tested. A likelihood ratio test rejected this restriction at all usual levels
of confidence.ss
Thus, we flnd evidence that saving equations for IRA and non-IRA
households are different. Thls is consiatent with the idea that IRA and non-
IRA households díffer systematically in unobserved determinants of saving.
This in turn implies that tests of the effects of IRAs on the lavel of saving
that depend on comparisons between IRA households and otherwise equivalent
non-contributors are not valid, at least in the context of our model.
(E) Policy Implicatíons
The results described above are consistent with the view that increasing
IRA limits in 1983-5 would have índuced little if any increase in national
saving. This need not imply, however, that all variants of IRA programs are
s`At the suggestion of Jonathan Skinner, we have compared our model
results to those obtained by ordinary least squares regressions of So on the X
varíablea. Our model estimates are closer to the actual means than OLS
estímates in 4 of the top 5 income classes for all households and 3 of the top
5 income classes for households with IRAs. These income classes account for
818 (unweighted) of the IRA holders in tha data set.
ss~e test statistic was 310. The 18 critical value for a likelihood
ratio test with 12 degrees of freedom ís 26.22. Much of the difference is due
to constraining ol-op. However, the statistic for testing ryl-ryZ was 116, which
still rejects the null hypothesis of equal coefficients at all usual
confídence levels.37
equally íneffective.3fi In the descriptive tables we showed that a
significant portion of IRA contributions are made by households over 59 and
thus are not subject to the early withdrawal penalty. Because IRA
contributions from these households are likely to be highly substitutable with
other forms of saving, eliminating eligibility for this group should raise the
proportion of increased IRA saving due to limit changes that would represent
increases in national saving.
To test this idea, we excluded household heads aged 60 to 65 in 1983 and
reestímated the model.s~ The maximum saving effect of a 11mit change rose to
358. If half of the tax cut were consumed, about 208 of the íncrease in IRA
contributions would represent new savíng. These figures relate only to the
proportion of increased IRA contributions that represent increases in national
saving. The actual level of IRA contributions would also change in an ~
priorl unknown manner. Neverthelass, the results are consistent with the
notion that the substitutability of IRAs and other saving is very high for
households 60 and over.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) eliminated deductibility of
contributions for married taxpayers with AGI above 550,000 and singles with
AGI above 535,000 that have pensions. The policy should reduce contributions
by higher income households relative to lower income households. In the SCF,
households wíth average 1983-5 income above these thresholds had much higher
ssFor example, Bernheim and Scholz ( 1992) describe a modified syatem of
tax-favored saving accounts that establish floors and ceilings for eligible
contributlons and allows these limits to vary with adjusted gross income.
Their proposal addresses a number of shortcomings of IRA-type saving plans.
57Reca11 that households older than 65 in 1983 had already been excluded.38
NIFA and were substantially older than the rest of the sample.5e This
suggests that these households may also have found IRAs and other saving to be
very good substitutes and that TRA may have raised the proportion of IRA
contrlbutions that represent net increases ín national saving. Corroborating
thís by estimating the effects of limiting deductíbility in our model,
however, would be very difficult.
V. Concluaíon
Our principal findings suggest that increasing IRA contribution limits
between 1983-86 would have resulted in little if any net increase in national
saving. These findings are consístent with the fact that most limit
contrlbutors either hold large amounts of non-IRA financial assets, and thus
may be able to shíft other saving into IRAs fairly readily, or are older than
59, and thus face no early withdrawal penalty on IRA contributions.
We have also tested the sensitivity and reliabílity of our results. Our
constructed IRA contríbutíons variable closely matches IRS data in several
important dimensions. A variety of sensitívity tests generally support the
principal finding though, as expected, some variation exists. One caveat to
our results is that, at a general level, household saving is diffícult to
predict using micro data. Thís caveat, of course, applies equally to other
studies.
After controlling for how the tax cut would be allocated, our results
suggest a significantly smaller impact of IRAs on saving than most previous
researchers have estímated. Relative to previous researchers, we use a
seFor married households with average 1983-5 income above SS0,000 and
single households with average 1983-5 income above 535,000, median 1983 NIFA
was 566,000 and median age was 55 years. These compare to 55,200 and 49 years
for the rest of the sample.39
different theoretical framework, which leads to different functional forms,
and employ a different data set. In addition, because of our data our results
are based on the behavior of households constrained by the limit in each of
three years, rather than in just one year. Although it is beyond the scope of
the current paper to explain the relative Smportance of each of these factors
in generatíng the dífferences ín results, further research into this area is
clearly warranted.
IRAs could affect saving through channels that we have not consídered.
For example, IRAs may serve as a means of "self control" (Thaler, 1990),
whereby individuals place funds in IRAs to restrict themselves from consuming
those funds in the (near) future, due to the penalty. As another example,
Summers (1986) and others suggest that the heavy promotion of IRAs may have
served to raise saving by educating the populace about the opportunities for,
and benefits of, saving. While each of these effects may be important, we
reiterate our earlier result that IRA contributors, and ín particular limit
contributors, hold substantial amounts of other assets, and thus at some level
appear to understand the benefits of saving. An alternative tradition argues
that households may save to reach specific target levels of wealth. To the
extent that households behave like target savers, IRAs will unambiguously
reduce saving because of the higher intereat rates provided.40
Appendix A
The consumer maximizes (2), subject to (3), (4), and (5) in each of
periods 1, 2, and 3. The third period problem is trivial, and involves
consuming all remaining wealth. In period 2, the consumer maximizes
(A-1) Vz(wz) ` ~(~z) t p V3(w3),
where the expectatíons operator is not needed because the value of Y, (and
hence all uncertainty) is revealed before second period consumption and saving
decisions are made.
To maximize (A-1) with respect to C„ an expression for W~ as a
function of Cz is needed. If there were only one asset, the expression
would be W~ ~(Wz-Cz)r, where z ís the gross return on the single asset.
However, when both IRAs and other assets exist, the expressíon for W3 is
more complicated. Let X- Yl ~ SóRo - C~ be liquid resources available for
saving in period 2. Since IRAs are perfect substitutes for other saving in
period 2, the optimal portfolio allocation rule is to place the first SL of X
into IRAs and the remainder into non-IRA saving. W; depends on X as
follows:sa
Case X a z sI so w,
(a) X) L L Y~-C~-L Só (Ro) 2iSi (RZ) ~~Y~RofL(Rz-Ro) -C~,Ro
(b) 0 S X~ L X
-SpRo SóRoRr ~ SÍ (Rr) ~' Y2Rr - CzeRr
(c) X ( 0 X -SáRo SóRo(RI) 2tSz(Rr)2iY2 (RI)Z-Cz~(RI)2
where C2~ is optimal consumption in state h, and W3 is obtained by
si'o keep the notation simple, we ignore the tax-deductíbility of IRA
contributions in this Appendix. It is easy to show that this does not affect
the functional forms that result for IRA and non-IRA saving, although the
parameter values would change.41
substítutíng SÍ and Só into the expression for W~ given in (S). State (a)
refers to a consumer who contributes the maximum amount to an IRA. State (b)
refers to someone who contríbutes a smaller positive amount or zero to an IRA.
State (c) refers to someone who has to withdraw IRA funds in the second
period.
Third period wealth in state h(h-a,b,c) can be rewritten as
W3 ' (W2 - C2h)Rh
where R~, -[Ro,Rr,(Rr)']~ and refers to the marginal interest rate the consumer
faces in cases a, b, and c, respectively, and
S1 R Z
(A-2) Wi ' SóRo ' I~ ` Y2 ~ Oh,
where Dd -(
L(R~-Ro)
0, 0]~. Wb is closely related to
0
Wz in (5). The
:
differences are (i) the RI coefficient on SÍ and (ii) D~,. The fírst
e
difference occurs because the ultimate preeent discounted value of SÍ
depends on when it is cashed in. The second difference occurs because in case
(a) the marginal return on savíng does not equal the average return, because
the consumer is holding both IRAs and other assets. Dr measures the
increased returns due to holding IRAs. Thus, We may be thought of as
effective wealth in period 2.
For each state h, the consumer chooses C~a to maximize42
(A-3)
V2(W2) ~ U(C2) ' T ~p Í~3(W3)
~ -(k-CZ)2 - ~ (k-(Wz-Ci)Rn)2
using the quadratíc functional form assumed in the text. Optimal consumption
satiafies
(A-4) Czt, ` qi k} 92Wi.
M ~
where qD ~ 1 P-R" and q; - R" The consumer then compares utility
1fP~R~ 1~ptR~.
attained in each state and makes the consumption and savings choices implied
by the state with the highest maximum V2.
Substituting (A-4) into (A-3) yíelds V~ as a function of W":
(A-S) VZ(WZ) ~ -~(1-ql)k-qzWi~Z - r~(lt9i~,)k -Rt,(1-qi)Wi~Z.
Turning to the first period, the consumer maxímizes
(A-6) Vi(W1) i U(C1) t~ E1~V2(Wz)'~
where the expectation operator is needed because Y~ and hence the state h
in period 2 are uncertain when first period decisions are made. To write (A-
6) as a function of SÍ and Sá (i) replace V~(W") with (A-5), (ii)
replace We with (A-2), and (ii i) use equation (4), the budget constraint,
to replace C1. Thís yields V1 as a function of SÍ and Só:43
(A-7)
S3RZ
Vl(Wl) ~ -Ik-Wi.Sol.Si )Z - ~El I (1-qi)k-qZ{So1Ro . -~ . YZ a~) ~2
S 1RZ
' ~ I (1.9iRn)k - Rr,(1-9i) ( SóRo . ~ . YZ . Dti} ]z
Maximization of (A-7) wlth respect to SÍ and Sá is straightforward, but
tedious,80 and yields first-order conditions of the following form:
(A-S)
Sol ' alk ' nzWl ' ~~ ' a4Si
Si ' ~ik ' ~zWi ' ~a - 9~So1.
where the a~'s and ~'s are complicated functions of all the parameters of the
model, and a3 and ~3 depend on E,IYz}. Equation (A-8) is equation (6) in the
text.
To derive (11) in the text, note that, dropping the 1 superscript,
when Sr - L, both Sr and So can be written in two ways, by (9) and
(10). Using (10) for So and (9) for Sr yields:
So ' oik ' a2Wi ' 03 - a~(áik'ázWi`á3).
By (9), however,
So ' á~k ' ásWi ' áe,
implying that al - o~bl t 6~, a2 - a~áZ t Ás, and a3 - a~b~ t áe.
Substituting these relations into (10) for So yíelds
So a á,,k ~ áyWl r be . aa(ó1kaá2Wltá3-L),
which is equal to (11) since Si - 81k 4 82W1 ~ bl.
6oDetails available upon request.44
Appendix B
The model given by ( 8), (9), and (11) is
0 if Si 5 0
SI - SÍ -X~ tu if OGSi GL
L íf Si z L
Xryl 4 cl
So ' Xryz 4 ~z
X72 ` 9(Si-L) 4 ~Z
íf SÍ 5 0
if OGSÍ GO
if Si ? L
We jointly estimate SI and So by maximum líkelihood assuming that (u,ej)
are distributed bivariate normal with standard deviations a„ and o~ and
correlation p„~, j - 1,2.
When Si a L, the error term in the So equation is c; L qu t c~. The
standard deviation of this expression is oz -[(~o„)' . a~ . 2qp„~o„O,]''; the
(~lou f Pusouaa) correlation of c~ and u is given by p;,, - .
O~O~
The log likelihood function consís[s of the sum over the relevant
portions of the following probabilitíes:45
(í) If Sr - 0 and the observed value of So occurs:
o~
S: ' p~i 1( So-So ) 1 ( o-Soll
1-~ o~c1oP~~).s o,~ lsol 11
(ii) If o ~ SIt L and the observed value of So occurs:
fz(u, cz, p„z)
(iíi) If Sr - L and the observed value of So occurs:
o~ C
Si t Pu2 . ( So - `ro )
~ Pu(1 Du2
).S ~ Z ~ ~ ~02~ ~ ~~
where f~ represents the bivariate normal density, ~ and m
normal distríbution and density, Sz ~]C~, and
' rXryl lf SI ~ 0
g }JlXyz if 0 ~ SI ~ 0
0
X7z . p(Si -L) íf SI - L
the univaríate
and Ó, 71, 7z, and ~ are estimated values of q, ryl, ryz, and ~.46
Aspendix C
This Appendix describes the calculation of IRA contributions and other
saving. The SCF reports asset and liability totals for varíous categories ín
1983 and 1986. The general strategy is as follows: to determine saving in an
asset X, note that
(C-1) BAi,X88 t BAI.XB3(larZ)3 ~ CONX83(ltr:)Z . CONXB~(14r~) t CONXes,
where BALX~ is the balance of asset X in year t, r~ is the (assumed constant)
after-tax rate of return on X, and CONX~ is net additions to X (i.e.,
saving in the form of asset X) in year t. We assume CONX~ - CONX, for all
t. Rearranging (C-1) yields
BALXqfi - BAI.XB3(lir:)3
CONX - .
(1-r~) 4 2 r r,
Saving in asset X is then calculated as 3tCONX.
Non-IRA saving is calculated as the net contríbutions to assets less new
debt incurred. To determine asset contributions, we use 1983 and 1986
balances of assets and liabilities and interest rate assumptions taken from
the Annual Statistical Digest, published by the Federal Reserve Board, the
,Saving.Inatitution Sourcebook, and the 1992 Bconomic Report of the President.
The asset and liabilíty categories, with interest rates gíven in parentheses,
are: checking and saving accounts (6.78); money market accounts and
certifícates of deposit (9.028); stocks and mutual funds (16.18); bonds
(12.048); profit sharing and thrift accounts (9.028); the cash value of whole
life policias (6.78); and other fínancíal assets (128). Chnnges In debt at'c.
determíned using the 1982 and 1985 balances of credít card debt (16.368) and47
other non-mortgage debt (16.369).81 Annual saving is then calculated as the
annual contributions to assets less liabilities. In the text we discuss
measurement error issues that arise from assuming that all households recalve
the average return on each category of asset and liabilíty.
Calculating the IRA contribution is slightly more complicated, because
IRA and KEOGH balances are reported separately in 1983 but are combined in
1986. Recall that the sample excludes all households where either the
respondent or spouse is self-employed. Thus, the following rules were used to
calculate the IRA balance in 1985 from the IRA and KEOGH balance: if in 1983
the household had an IRA (KEOGH) but no KEOGH (IRA), impute the 1986 balance
to an IRA (KEOGH); if the household had neither in 1983, attribute the balance
to an IRA; if the household had both in 1983, allocate the 1986 balance by
maintaining the 1983 proportions.
We use an average of stock and bond returns, 148, to calculate estimated
annual IRA contributions, Y. IRA saving is given by
SI - 3~ max (Y,0) if Y 5 0
- 3~ min (Y,L) if Y 2 0,
where L is the upper limit on annual contributions (see footnote 1). Y can
exceed L because rollovers of other assets into IRAs are allowed under certain
circumstances. We describe our efforts to assess the accuracy of the IRA
calculation in the text and in Table 1.
The other variables used in the empirical work are described below:
gge - age of head of household in 1986.
B1This differs from Gale and Scholz (1990) in that separate interest
rates are now used for each asset and liability category.48
~e Squared - age of head of household in 1986 squared.
come - sum of reported íncome in 1983, 19g4, 1985.
sio - 1 if household owns a pensíon ln 1983, 0 otherwise.
Education - average of 1983 and 1986 values of years of education of household
head.
Family Size - number of people ín the family in 1983.
Non-IRA Financial Assets - 1983 level of checking, saving, money market
accounts and certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, cash
value of life insurance, and other financial assets.
Debt - total debt on credit cards, mortgages, property and other business, or
consumer loans, all in 1983 levels.
Nonliauid Assets - value of home and gross value of property and business
assets in 1983.
IRA Dummv - 1 if a household reported having an IRA in 1983.
Home - 1 if a household owned their home ín 1983.
LIOCON - 1 íf in 1983 a household reported being either turned down for credit
or discouraged from borrowing in the past few years.49
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Appendix Table 1
Unweighted Sample Statistics of Variables Used in Estimation
of Table 4
Varieble Definitlon ~Y ~ilII1mSU9 M~YS1BSdID
AGER age of respondent, 1986 45.4635 12.1307 25.000 68.000
SAVINGIR non-IRA saving, 1983-85 2.3187 22.6965 -98.116 99.319
IRACONTI IRA contributions, 1983-85 1.3256 2.9884 -4.000 12.000
INCOMER income, 1983-85 1.0358 1.2285 0.004 24.000
PENSION pension dummy 0.3877 0.4874 0.000 1.000
EDUC years of education 12.8577 2.7974 0.000 17.000
MAXIRA IRA cont. limit, 1983-85 8.4670 2.7337 6.000 12.000
FAMSIZE family size 3.0118 1.4348 1.000 13.000
NIFA83R non-IRA financial asseta 1.6996 9.6428 0.000 291.900
TDEBT83R total debt in 1983 2.1350 4.1749 0.000 90.575
NLIQA83R nonliquid assets in 1983 0.8950 2.1156 0.000 41.879
AGESQR age squared 2.2158 1.1355 0.625 4.624
LIQCONST liquidity constrained 0.1902 0.3926 0.000 1.000
IRA83DUM IRA balance in 1983 gt 0 0.2131 0.4096 0.000 1.000











AGESQR in 1000 years54
Appendix Table 2
Numbet of Households Excluded by Each Sample Selection Criterionl
Initial Sample 2,822
Head 5 24 years old 31
Head z 65 years old 466






1Some households are excluded by more than one criterion.
ZThe number of households excluded after all the previously lísted
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